Articles

This three-part feature exists to ask what should happen there, what is likely to happen there, and what either outcome would mean. The first piece cannot begin at the convention. It has to begin at a distance from the convention, with the most basic question: what is being claimed, and by whom, when someone uses the word libertarian?

This article examines Venezuela as the present-tense case study, surveys the ongoing operations that receive far less attention, and asks the only question that ultimately matters: what does the choice between republic and empire look like when the empire is not a memory but a current event?

This article examines that architecture of US Debt and Finance. What it is, how it was built, what it enables, and why it is no longer working the way its designers intended. The military empire traced throughout this series could not exist without the monetary system that finances it. Understanding that system is the precondition for understanding both the power the United States has exercised over three generations and the limits it is now beginning to encounter.

“Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”—George F. Kennan, The New York Times, Februa

This article examines three interventions — Libya, Syria, and Yemen — that together constitute the proof that the pattern identified throughout this series is not a series of mistakes but a structural feature of American foreign policy. The question is no longer whether interventionism fails. It is whether the system that produces it can be changed.

On September 11, 2001, 2,977 Americans were murdered by al-Qaeda terrorists operating from Afghanistan. Twenty years later, in August 2021, the last American forces evacuated Kabul as the Taliban—the same Taliban the United States had overthrown in 2001—reclaimed control of the country. The Afghan government America had spent two decades building collapsed in eleven days. Twenty years of progress, two trillion dollars, and thousands of lives were erased in less than a fortnig

The question is not whether foreign influence exists. It does, and it is as old as the republic. The question is whether these relationships serve American interests. That is the question George Washington asked in 1796. It remains the right question today.

The 1990s are remembered as a decade of peace and prosperity—the Clinton years, the dot-com boom, the “end of history.” But they were not a decade of peace. They were a decade of intervention: the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, ongoing strikes against Iraq. More importantly, they were the decade when the architecture of permanent intervention was constructed.

The Afghan operation was the largest CIA covert action since Vietnam. It succeeded brilliantly in its immediate objective: the Soviets withdrew, humiliated, their empire weakened. But covert operations have consequences beyond their immediate objectives. The enemy of our enemy is not our friend—he is merely our enemy’s enemy. Arming religious extremists to fight secular communists does not produce moderates; it produces empowered extremists.

Vietnam is the template against which all American interventions must be measured. The pattern established—initial optimism, escalation without clear objectives, lies to sustain public support, eventual failure, and determined forgetting—would repeat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The “lessons of Vietnam” would be invoked to justify subsequent wars while the actual lessons were ignored.

This article examines the covert operations that the Church Committee exposed and contextualized—the secret history of American foreign policy from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. These operations share common features: they were justified by Cold War necessity, executed without democratic accountability, produced catastrophic long-term consequences, and were subsequently forgotten or rationalized.

This article examines the coup, its origins, its execution, and its consequences. The story is essential for understanding American covert action—its methods, its justifications, and its predictable failures. Iran 1953 established the template that would be applied in Guatemala, the Congo, Chile, and beyond: identify a target government, frame it as a communist threat, recruit local assets, create chaos, install a friendly dictator, and declare victory for freedom.

This article examines how the national security state was constructed in the years following World War II. The institutions created in this period—the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, NATO, the global network of military bases—remain the architecture of American power today. Understanding how they were built, and what they replaced, is essential to evaluating whether the transformation was necessary, whether it has made Am

The “Old Right”—a term applied retrospectively to the coalition that opposed American intervention in World War II—represented the last significant American political movement to defend the founders’ foreign policy of non-intervention. Their arguments were not answered; they were rendered moot by Pearl Harbor and then retroactively discredited by court historians who wrote the interventionists’ perspective into scholarly consensus. The phrase “isolationist,” applied as a pejo

Understanding Sykes-Picot is essential to understanding why the Middle East looks the way it does—and why American intervention there repeatedly fails.

Understanding how America entered World War I is essential to understanding how America enters every war since. The patterns established in 1917—the manufacture of consent, the financial entanglements that precede intervention, the ideological framing that forecloses compromise, the suppression of dissent once war begins—have repeated with remarkable consistency for over a century.

To understand America’s entry into World War I—and to evaluate whether it was wise—we must first understand the world Americans were being asked to enter. This article examines the European imperial system: its origins, its logic, and its catastrophic failure. Before Americans can judge whether intervention was necessary, they must grasp what intervention meant: joining a continent-spanning network of automatic commitments that could transform any local dispute into general w

Understanding 1898 is essential because the patterns established then have repeated throughout the subsequent century: the triggering incident of disputed origin, the media hysteria, the humanitarian justification for commercial and strategic interests, the executive manipulation of Congress, the marginalization of critics as unpatriotic, and the unforeseen consequences that produce the next intervention. From the Maine to the Gulf of Tonkin to weapons of mass destruction, th

I more than suspect already, that he is deeply conscious of being in the wrong—that he feels the blood of this war, like the blood of Abel, is crying to Heaven against him. —Abraham Lincoln on President Polk, 1848

“Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.” —Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, 1801